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Notes from a Study of the Caseload of the
Minnesota Supreme Court: Some
Comments and Statistics on
Pressures and Responses
Charles W. Wolfram*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Between October 1, 1967, and September 20, 1968,1 the Supreme Court of Minnesota delivered 306 opinions in a slightly
greater number of cases. 2 The Court accomplished this task
with a membership of seven justices, a number that has remained unchanged since 1930. 3 The Court receives direct as* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. The
author wishes to express his appreciation to members of the Law Review who assisted in the collection of statistics upon which this article
in part is based, particularly to Messrs. Richard P. Keller and Allan A.
Ryan, second-year students at the Law School and candidates for membership on the Review. The author, of course, takes sole responsibility
for content.
1. These dates encompass what the Review has previously referred to as the "Term" of the Minnesota Supreme Court. As the editors of previous volumes have pointed out, the unit of measurement
differs from the Court's statutory term which commences on the first
Tuesday after the first Monday in January. See MmrN. STAT. § 480.01
(1967); Note, The Minnesota Supreme Court 1963-1964, 49 Mn1q. L.
REv. 93 (1964). As is pointed out by the Volume 49 editors, however, a
September-October Term is used for the convenience of scheduling and
presenting student writing. In order to permit comparison with previously published Review statistics, the data forming the basis of the
present work was organized conformably. While this precludes direct
comparison with the caseload statistics prepared by the Administrative
Assistant to the Minnesota Supreme Court-maintained on a JanuaryDecember basis and published annually-little is lost for present purposes since the two sets of statistics largely overlap, the Administrative
Assistant's detailed statistics being available only for the years since
1963. Finally, the data used by Professor Pirsig in his 1940 study of
the work of the Minnesota Supreme Court, Pirsig, The Work of the
Supreme Court of Minnesota, 25 MTN. L. REv. 821 (1941), was based on
the statutory January-December term. The statistics given there have
been employed at places herein without any attempt to convert them.
Hereafter "Term" refers to an October-September measurement and
"statutory term" refers to the official January-December measurement.
2. See Table I, 1967-1968 Term, infra at 1043. The number of
opinions delivered during a typical Term will ordinarily be 10-20 less
than the number of cases actually decided because of the consolidation
of cases on appeal or for decision after separate argument. It should
be noted that throughout this article the unit of measurement is the
number of opinions delivered, not the number of cases decided.
3. See Heiberg, Social Backgrounds of the Minnesota Supreme
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sistance in writing opinions only from one retired justice; he
has succeeded a series of statutory commissioners who have
continuously been assisting the seven-justice Court since first
permitted by legislation in 1943. 4 The work of the Court is
being carried on in quarters that were first furnished to it in
1905, and which have been little expanded since that time.
And the Court is accomplishing the work of liquidating its caseload with a membership whose average age might be thought to
counsel less hurried activities.5 The burden thought to be imposed by these conditions has led the Court and the Judicial
Council of Minnesota 6 recently to recommend that the Governor
Court Justices, 53 AMbw. L. REV. 901, 902 (1969). The Supreme Court
expanded to its present size of a chief justice and six associate justices
pursuant to an amendment to Article VI, section 2 of the Minnesota
Constitution adopted by the voters in November, 1930. THE JUDICIAL
CouNcIL OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, BIENNIAL REPORT 19 (1968) [hereinafter cited as JUDICIAL CouNcIL REPORT], incorrectly states that the number of justices was increased to seven in 1920. The amendment was
proposed by ch. 430, [1929] Minn. Laws 676. In the 17-year period
between 1913 and 1930, the workload was shared by a chief justice, four
associate justices, and two nonvoting commissioners.
There is good reason to believe that the membership of the Supreme Court was not "legally" raised to seven until publication of the
Revised Statutes of 1941. The preceeding statute, MN.N GEN. STAT.
§ 129 (1927), stated that the Court's membership consisted of a chief
justice and four associates, using the language of ch. 96, § 1, [1919]
Minn. Laws 93.
4. See ch. 595, § 3, [1943] Minn. Laws 1870. Since 1943, the
Court has been assisted by at least one commissioner. Present legislation permits either a retired justice, a commissioner of the Court, or a
district judge to act as a justice at the appointment of the Court. MINN.
STAT. § 2.724, subd. 2 (1967). In addition, a justice who has resigned
may be appointed by the Court as a "commissioner."

MIN.

STAT.

§ 480.21, subd. 1 (1967). Finally, a retired justice may also be appointed
a "commissioner" by order of the Court. MN. STAT. § 490.025, subd.
5 (1967). While neither statute nor rule of the Court make it clear,
apparently the functions of "justice" and "commissioner" differ principally in that a temporary justice may be given a vote in the decision
of cases while a commissioner may not. The present section 2.724,
subd. 2, was enacted in 1957, and the temporary justice has not exercised effective voting power since the number of majority justices has
always been sufficient to carry the day. See note 96 infra.
5. Calculated as of January 1, 1968, the average age of the seven
regular justices was 60.4 years. Including Mr. Justice Gallagher, the
average age was 62.9 years. Among all eight justices there are two age
groupings, separated by a difference of at least 13 years: Gallagher, J.
(80); Nelson, J. (78); Murphy, J. (69); Knutson, C.J. (68); Otis, J. (55);
Rogosheske, J. (53); Sheran, J. (51); and Peterson, J. (49).
6. The Judicial Council was first organized in 1937 and consists
of a group of eminent attorneys and judges mainly appointed by the
Governor, but including several judicial officers sitting ex officio. See
Mnw. STAT. § 483.02 (1967).
In its recent recommendations to the
Governor and Legislature it was clearly speaking for most members of
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and Legislature take prompt steps to create an intermediate
court of appeals, as well as to implement certain less radical
measures to relieve the caseload of the Supreme Court3
There seems to be rather general agreement among lawyers
who follow the work of the Court that the caseload battle has
recently reached a crisis stage. However, between January 1,
1927, and December 31, 1927, with a membership of five justices
and two commissioners, s the Minnesota Supreme Court delivered
509 opinions in disposing of 538 cases, with accouterments, quarters, and average age of membership roughly comparable to that
of the present Court.9 In fact, when it was reported about a decade later that the Court in 1937 had written 293 opinions in 307
cases and in 1938 had written 290 opinions in 302 cases, it was
apparently felt necessary to suggest that the decline in the caseload did not necessarily mean that the amount of work required
had declined by exactly the same percentage.1 0 It was apparently assumed, nonetheless, that the work required of the Court
and its members had reverted by the late thirties to more comfortable and manageable proportions. At the very least, contemporary writing on the work of the Court contains no recommendation for relieving it of part of its caseload."
the Supreme Court. See Knutson, Appellate Review by Divisions,
Mixw. BENcn &BAn, Nov., 1967, at 6.
7. JuDIciAL CoUNcIL REPORT, supra note 3, at 13. The report,
due on or before October 1, 1968, Mn N. STAT. § 483.03 (1967), was publicly released on January 9, 1969. See Minneapolis Star, Jan. 9, 1969,
at 18B, col. 8.
The Judicial Council also recommended an increase in the number
of justices to nine, the maximum permitted under ATMnu.
CoNsT. art. VI,
§ 2, and the addition of two commissioners to assist in opinion-writing.
See JUDIcIAL CouNcm REPORT, supra note 3, at 21-22.
8. See The Supreme Court of Minnesota, 173 Minn. iii (1928);
Justices of the Supreme Court of Minnesota During the Time of These
Reports, 169 Minn. iii (1927).
9. On caseload, see Pirsig, supra note 1, at 824-26. Including
only the then chief justice and associate justices, the average age on
January 1, 1927, was 62.2 years. Including the two commissioners siting pursuant to ch. 62, [1913] Minn. Laws 53, the average age was 63.6
years. The ages were: Samuel B. Wilson, C.J. (54); Andrew Holt, J.
(72); James H. Quinn, J. (70); Holmer B. Dibell, J. (63); Royal A.
Stone, J. (52); Myron D. Taylor, C. (72); and Edward Lees, C. (62).
10. See Pirsig, supra note 1, at 826.
11. See id. About this time (1942), a Committee on the Unification of the Courts submitted a report to the Judicial Council of Minnesota that was truly revolutionary in several respects. Many of its
proposals--"merit selection" of judges; 'T"_issouri Plan" elective judicial
offices; full empowerment of the Supreme Court to formulate rules,
including rules of evidence, for the operation of the lower courts; and
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The temptation that arises from this brief historical comparison is to pinpoint the inefficiency of the Court's present
processes, and not the size of its caseload, as the chief cause of
any lag in present case disposition."
One is tempted to
ask whether any other factor would adequately explain why a
Court that could deliver 509 opinions in 1927 should be viewed
as verging on crisis when it delivers 306 opinions-only 60 per
cent of its former accomplishment-a generation later. In the
pages that follow, I hope to offer suggestions for dealing with
such temptations, suggestions that nonetheless leave unanswered
many questions regarding the ailments currently afflicting, and
said to be afflicting, the Minnesota Supreme Court.
The comments here set forth are in response to an invitation
from the editors of the Law Review to prepare an introduction
3
to the annual issue devoted to Mimaesota legal developments.
My intention is to investigate preliminarily two related areas:
First, some statistics concerning the workload of the Minnesota
Supreme Court; and, second, a recent major innovation--divisional sittings of the Court-that has been adopted to provide a
temporary solution to the threatening build-up of its workload. The statistics derive from a partially completed private
study of the processes of the Minnesota Supreme Court. It has
been undertaken too recently for inclusion of all its present findings, because of the need for cross-checking, and in many respects the initial investigation of important areas still must be
the removal of jurisdictional distinctions between courts within the
state-go far beyond even the modernized system presently in operation. Though there was no provision for an intermediate court of appeals, there was a proposal to permit the Court to refuse leave to appeal in certain cases. See Anderson, Reorganizing Minnesota's Judiciary, 27 MIrN. L. REv. 383, 386 (1943). These proposals, which contemplated a broad implementing constitutional amendment, were never
approved by the Legislature. For a history of the 1942 proposals and
their "cold if not hostile reception," see Pirsig, The Proposed Amendment of the Judiciary Article of the Minnesota Constitution, 40 MINN.
L. REv. 815-16 (1956).
12. To be sure, it has been argued that the complexity of the issues
facing the Court has greatly increased in recent years, making inappropriate any direct comparison with the accomplishments of appellate
courts of another time. This has previously been suggested by a noted
commentator to explain a change in the work pace of the Court at a
different period. See Pirsig, supra note 1, at 826. I am not entirely convinced that the argument is sound. My suspicion instead is that a
social-legal order that produces increasingly complex problems probably produces with rough correspondence increasingly better-trained
judges and more efficient research tools to resolve them.
13. Citations to prior annual collections of work on the Minnesota
Supreme Court are given at note 18 infra.
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completed. From the results of this study, I hope to be able
eventually to contribute to the formulation of proposals for relieving the docket of the Supreme Court. But since the study is
not yet completed, I wish to make clear my feelings on one such
proposal, the recent recommendation of the Minnesota Judicial
Council to create an intermediate court of appeals.14 First,
great caution should be exercised in increasing the cost, complexity and delay attendant upon obtaining appellate review of
trial court and administrative agency action in the State. Second, however, I must state that I am not now in a position to report either statistics or findings that bear directly and with persuasive force upon the issue of creating an intermediate court
of appeals.'5 With regard to that issue, it should be appreciated that statements made here are preliminary and in places
14. THE JuDiciAL CouNcIL

REPORT,

supra note 3, at 13. As men-

tioned in note 7 supra, the Report of the Judicial Council became avail-

able only on January 9, 1969, at which time this article had already
substantially taken its final shape. While certain aspects of the Report
will be commented upon herein, it has been impossible in the time available to analyze thoroughly either its major recommendations or the
reasons given for them.
15. While clearly calling for the earliest possible creation of an
intermediate court of appeals, the Report of the Judicial Council recognizes that a constitutional amendment will first be required. Id. at 2223. Ironically, less than 15 years ago such an amendment would
have been unnecessary as the language of Article VI, section 1, then
clearly permitted the establishment by the Legislature of ". . . such
other courts, inferior to the supreme court, as the legislature may from
time to time establish by a two-thirds vote." MIhNN. CONST. art. VI,
§ 1 (West's perm. vol. 1946). This language had been in the Minnesota Constitution from the time it was written in 1857. A change was
apparently inadvertently precipitated by a post-World War II movement to amend the state Constitution wholesale. While retention of
the language of Article VI, section 1, was contemplated, Judiciary
Committee, Preliminary Report on Revision of the Judiciary Article of
the Minnesota State Constitution, 32 MxiN.L. REV. 458, 460 (1948), the
present version of Article VI, section 1, as approved by the voters in
November, 1956, does not seem to permit the creation of a court intermediate between the Supreme Court and the district courts. See MInN.
CONST. art. VI, § 1. At the time, this omission met with litle alarm. In
fact, in commenting on raising the number of authorized associate
justices from six to eight, one observer stated:
[T]he change is not dictated by any present need. The number
of cases appealed has declined drastically over the last twentyfive years, from approximately 500 cases in which opinions
were rendered to about 200 at the present time....
Pirsig, supra note 11, at 818. Professor Pirsig went on to caution, however, that in contemplation of "future needs" the present Article VI,
section 1, would have been improved by a provision authorizing the
creation of divisions within the Court. Id. He then suggested that it
also would have been wiser to provide for an appellate division of the
district court to dispose of evidence-sufficiency appeals. Id.
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subject to possible revision in the :ight of future findings and
developments.
II.

STATISTICS ON THE WORKLOAD OF THE COURT

A. SCOPE

OF THE MEASUREM=T

Set out in the series of Tables that appears following the
present article are some of the data gathered from the opinions
of the Minnesota Supreme Court delivered during the four
Terms between October 1, 1964, and September 30, 1968.16 Generally, the Tables have been designed to permit easy comparison with similar collections of data that have appeared
from time to time in the pages of the Review. 17 More detailed explanation of the arrangement and composition of the
Tables is set out immediately prior to the pages on which the
Tables appear for the convenience of those referring directly to
them. With the publication of these tables the volumes of the
Review now contain some comparably similar statistics covering
the Court's operations during the following ten periods: 1927,
1937, 1938, 1959-1960, 1962-1963, 1963-1964, 1964-1965, 1965-1966,
1966-1967 and 1967-1968.18
The statistics for these periods of the Court's operations,
and the comments below that are based on these statistics, rely
upon the number of opinions rather than cases. The total number of each differs in any year because two or more "cases" may
be separately docketed in the Supreme Court but treated as a
unit for the purposes of briefing, argument and delivery of
an opinion. As a rough guide, an annual production of 200 opinions typically seems sufficient to dispose of approximately 210-215
cases. Since writing an opinion in a typical two-case situation
calls for about the same amount of judicial effort as that where
only one case is appealed, it would seem that no distortion of
the Court's workload results. 19 Another possible source of
16. See pages 1026-47 infra.
17. See the authorities cited note 18 infra.
18. The data for the 1927, 1937 and 1938 statutory terms is derived
from Pirsig, supra note 1, at 824-39. Data for the 1959-1960 Term is
derived from Note, The Minnesota Supreme Court 1959-1960, 45 Mlum.
L. Rav. 123-26 (1960). For the 1962-1963 Term, see Note, The Minnesota Supreme Court 1962-1963, 48 Mhm. L. REv. 119, 121-25 (1963).
For the 1963-1964 Term, see Note, The Minnesota Supreme Court
1963-1964, 49 Mum. L. REv. 93, 95-99 (1964).
19. The annual reports of the Administrative Assistant contain the
number of both opinions and cases. These now cover statutory terms
commencing in January, 1957. See AnwrmsTRATv AssIsTANT, FIRST
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distortion is the use of the number of decided cases, or issued
opinions, as the measure of the pressures upon the Court, rather
than using the actual number of cases on its docket. In other
words, relying upon the number of opinions released as a guide
to the Court's workload possibly could belie a large increase in
the backlog of pending but undecided cases. Data released over
the past six years by the Administrative Assistant to the Supreme Court reveals, however, that the increase in the number
of docketed but undecided cases has not, in net effect, been
20
accompanied by an increase in the size of the Court's backlog.
Thus, it is believed that the use of the number of recorded dispositions will provide a useful indicator of the Court's workload.
There remains, however, one portion of the Court's docket
that is largely immune from consideration when analysis is confined to opinions rather than cases. These are the so-called
"special" matters that are heard by the Court. Only some of
these result in written opinions and are consequently included
in the present enumeration. Encompassed within the Court's
description of special matters are petitions for extraordinary
writs, bar disciplinary matters, and motions of various kinds.
During the 1967 statutory term of the Supreme Court, there were
95 such special matters before it.21 Nothing short of an examination of the Court's files--an examination not yet undertakenwould permit an accurate evaluation of the degree to which resolution of questions arising on these special matters consumes the
time and energies of the Justices. It nonetheless is assumed
that the special matters which do not result
in written opinions
22
consume little of the average justice's time.
AwNuAL REPORT ON MNNESOTA COURTS (1965), and the Annual Reports
for subsequent years. During 1965-1967, the three-year average was
242.0 "regular" cases and 245.6 opinions in all kinds of cases. As
explained at note 21 infra, and accompanying text, there are also
always a number of "special" cases that result in an opinion.
20. Cf., e.g., AMmSTRATV AssIsTANT, FOURaT ANNUAL REPORT
ON MNNEOTA COURTS 4-5 (1968).
One must rely in part upon surmise,
for there are no statistics in the various Annual Reports relating di-

rectly to the number of pending cases. There are, however, statements

and statistics about such closely related matters as the average time
between notice of appeal and release of the opinion and the number of
all kinds of cases decided.

21. See id. at 6.
22. From time to time, however, instances come to the surface of
special matters not resulting in an opinion that nonetheless must have
consumed considerable time. See, e.g., Rotering v. Jones, 277 Minn. 253,
256, 152 N.W.2d 353, 354 (1967). For an example of a situation where
summary disposition without an opinion was clearly called for, see
State v. Seebold, 280 Minn. 241, 243, 158 N.W.2d 854, 855 (1968).

946
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Finally, it should also be noted that members of the Court
have undertaken, sometimes in response to statutory commands
and at other times in response to feelings of professional and
civic responsibility, to engage in many activities not directly related to the disposition of appealed cases. The extent to which
these activities divert any member of the Court from his more
narrowly defined judicial functions is also unknown. For certain justices, most notably the Chief Justice,28 the diversion
must be considerable.
B.

INTERPRETATION

Turning then to the figures, and confining one's view to the
last decade, the following table represents the number of opinions filed by the Supreme Court:
TABLE A2

TERM
Signed (Majority)
Opinions
Per Curiam
Total

4

19591960

19621963

19631964

19641965

19651966

19661967

19671968

163
12
175

186
11
197

188
32
220

206
7
213

193
20
213

230
35
265

270
36
306

It appears from this that it is only in the relatively recent past
that the court has been required to deal with a radically increased number of dispositions. This becomes significant when
one recalls that the number of opinions delivered during each of
these Terms, with the sole exception of 1967-1968, was lower than
the number delivered in the slack years of 1937 and 1938.25 It is
not known what the precise count of opinions was during the
23. The Chief Justice must, of course, exercise general superintendence over the staff and day-to-day operations of the Court. In
addition, he has extraordinary functions, such as serving as a member
of the Board of Pardons, see MIn-N. STAT. § 638.01 (1967), and the Judicial Council, see MixiN. STAT. § 483.02 (1967), supervising and coordinating the work of the district courts of the state, see MmN. STAT. § 2.724,
subd. 2 (1967) and, to some extent, the assignment of judges of the municipal courts, MINN. STAT. § 2.724, subd. 3 (1967). By Mx. STAT.
§ 2.724 (1967), the Supreme Court is empowered to provide by rule that
the Chief Justice need not write opinions. To date, the Rules of Civil
Appellate Procedure contain no such exemption. For the opinion
production of the Chief Justice during the four most recent Terms, see
Tables I for the 1964-1968 Terms infra a: 1028, 1033, 1038 & 1043.
24. This is a compilation of figures from the sources cited or referred to at note 18 supra, and from the Tables I for the 1964-1968
Terms, infra at 1028, 1033, 1038 & 1043.
25. See note 9 supra, and accompanying text. There were 293
opinions delivered in 1927, 290 in 1938.
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years between 1938 and 1959,26 but one survey suggests that it
mildly fluctuated, at most times being between approximately
140-225 opinions.2 7 In short, the steep increases in the number of
decisions during the 1966-1967 and 1967-1968 Terms hardly seem
appropriate as the sole indicators of what future years will bring.
Somewhat incredibly, however, the recent report of the Judicial
Council suggests that just such a continued escalation seems
probable. 28 Simply as a matter of statistics, the prediction seems
far from probable.
1.

Criminal Cases

The introduction of factors other than selected statistics
may aid in making a forecast of the future size of the caseload of
the Supreme Court. A search for the most dominant of such
factors quickly reveals that the increase in the additional work
26. In Pirsig, supra note 11, at 818, it was stated that "the
number of cases appealed has declined drastically over the last
twenty-five years, from approximately 500 cases in which opinions
were rendered to about 200 at the present time .... " Justice Knutson reports that in 1948 the number of formal opinions written by
the Court was 150. Knutson, supra note 6, at 6.
27. In ADMINISTRATIVE AssIsTANT, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT ON MINNESOTA CouRTs 9 (1966), there appears a graph of the trends of the Supreme Court workload between 1939 and 1964. According to this, the
number of opinions was between 300 and 340 during 1939-41, in 1942
it fell to below 280 and by 1945 was just slightly over 140. From
1945 until the 1966-67 Term, the Court apparently became accustomed
to a workload that never exceeded 220 opinions in any year. Id. Ironically, during its post-1930 history the seven-justice Court was first
given the assistance of a commissioner in 1943, by which time the great
weight of its 1920-40 docket had already been diminished by half. See
note 4, supra.
28. See, e.g., JumiciAl CouNcH. REPORT, supra note 3, at 19:
Assuming a continuing increase in the number of appeals
[similar to the increase during the three statutory terms of
1965, 1966 and 1967], it is immediately apparent that the Supreme Court will soon reach a point where it cannot hope to
discharge its functions properly. For example, 400 to 500 written opinions per year will be quite probable by the mid-1970's.
It is humanly impossible for a justice to write 70 opinions in a
year!
In 1927, two justices and one commissioner wrote between 71 and 76
opinions each. Dividing the number of opinions for 1927, see Pirsig,
supra note 1, at 825, by the number of members (7) results in an average
of 72.7 opinions per member. Excluding the 38 per curiam opinions delivered that year, each member produced an average of 67.3 opinions.
While this might have both been herculean and resulted in bad opinions, it does show that it is "humanly possible." With respect to the
statistical validity of the Judicial Council's straight-line projection, using only the 1964-1967 caseload figures, the less said the better.
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to which the Court finds itself subjected in the past two Terms
has been caused mainly, although not entirely, by an increase in
the number of criminal cases:
B
1962- 19631963 1964
34
31
175
145
TABLE

TERM
Criminal
Civil
Total

19591960
22
138

16029

1964- 19651965 1966
39
64
149
174

17930 20631 213

213

1966- 19671967 1968
100
127
179
165
265

306

The pressure from the responsibility of disposing of criminal
cases has increased substantially during the years 1964-1968.
From 39 cases in the 1964-1965 Term (18 per cent of the caseload)
the figures rise steadily: 64 cases in the 1965-1966 Term (30 per
cent of the caseload); 100 cases in the 1966-1967 Term (38 per
cent of the caseload); and 127 cases in the 1967-1968 Term ( 41 per
cent of the caseload). But in spite of the fact that criminal cases
are the single most important source of additional opinions, it
would be inaccurate to cite criminal cases, or the criminal law bar,
as the only culprits. An uneven, but occasionally substantial increase in the number of civil cases over the past decade has also
played a part. One probably would wish that the most radical increase had occurred in the category of civil cases rather than criminal cases. In the criminal area, greater caution must be exercised
so that desires for a less crowded appellate calendar do not
over-balance unique, familiar and accepted rights of the criminally accused. This, of course, is not to suggest that it would be
unthinkable to exercise controls over the number and kinds of
criminal cases to come before the Court, but only that caution
would be required in the formulation of any such controls.
In reviewing the number and kinds of criminal cases to be
heard, the conventional distinction has been drawn between
appeals from post-conviction proceedings-including both habeas
29. Totals less than 175 opinions (see Table A and text accompanying note 24 supra) because of the deletion of 15 opinions not

classified. See Note, The Minnesota Supreme Court 1959-1960, 45
1MIqN. L. REv. 123, 125 (1960).

30. Totals less than 197 opinions (see Table A and text accompany-

ing note 24 supra) because of the deletion of 18 opinions not classified.
See Note, The Minnesota Supreme Court 1962-1963, 48 MxiNW. L. REv.
119, 124 (1963).
31. Totals less than 220 opinions (see Table A and text accompanying note 24 supra) because of the deletion of 14 opinions not classified.
See Note, The Minnesota Supreme Court 1963-1964, 49 1Mnr. L. REv. 93,

98 (1964).
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corpus and statutory review actions-and appeals directly from
the original trial itself. Conveniently, it has developed that
trends in each of these broad areas have diverged and largely
distinct problems of policy have emerged, making appropriate
separate discussions of the two kinds of appeals as factors in the
total caseload of the Supreme Court.
(a)

Post-conviction Review Appeals

Although they are an obvious suspect, on closer inspection
post-conviction review appeals seem to hold little promise
as a starting point for an explanation of the substantial recent
increase in the total number of docketed cases. It thus probably
would prove to be an ineffective point at which to insert controls over the number of such cases coming to the Court in an
effort to relieve its overall burdens. Figures from the study of
the operations of the Supreme Court between 1964 and 1968 indicate that although the number of post-conviction review cases
decided by the Supreme Court rose from 12 in the 1964-1965
Term to 34 in the 1966-1967 Term, the number has decreased to
28 in the Term that ended in September, 1968.32 There are
probable explanations both for the rather low number of postconviction cases in the past decade, and for the apparent decline
in such cases during the most recent Term. For one thing, the
period of time within which a person convicted of crime may
appeal directly from his conviction is quite long in Minnesotasix months.38 Significant in this regard is the statistic that of the
90 direct criminal appeals decided during the 1967-1968 Term,
21 were taken by persons who had entered pleas of guilty at the
time of their original trials. This suggests that the length of
time within which the direct appeal can be taken is sufficiently
long to permit convicted persons to change their minds about
the advisability of pleading guilty and to appeal without being
required to resort to a new hearing at the trial level. It is thus
32. It has not been possible to derive precise figures for the respective numbers of post-conviction review and direct appeal criminal
cases coming before the Court during the 1959-1960, 1962-1963 and
1963-1964 Terms for inclusion in Table B, supra. The method of categorization in the earlier Supreme Court Notes makes it either impossible or risky to attempt to determine the different kinds of criminal cases, with the exception of the Note on the 1962-1963 Term,
which indicates that 12 of the 34 criminal cases were either habeas
corpus or coram nobis.
33. Mlm. STAT. § 632.01 (1967). By contrast, an appeal from a
denial of post-conviction relief must be taken within 60 days. Mum.
STAT. § 590.06 (1967).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:939

even more probable that persons who have pleaded not guilty,
and who thereby would appear statistically more probable
sources of appellate work for the Supreme Court, are more likely
to have raised issues upon their original trials and either obtained review through a direct appeal or determined to forego
their right to appeal. In short, it is probable that most convicts
during the first six months after conviction either decide to contest their incarceration-in which event it is probable that they
resort to the still-available direct appeal-or resign themselves
to serving out their sentences.
Theoretically it still might be necessary to provide habeas
corpus or a similar statutory procedure 34 in order to receive
evidence at the trial level on issues not raised at the original
trial. This might be expected to result in a substantial number
of post-conviction cases being brought to the Supreme Court, in
spite of the long period of time within which to take a direct
appeal. But, probably with the partial purpose of removing such
a threat to its docket, the Supreme Court recently has shown
ingenuity in inventing and developing special criminal trial procedures calculated to guarantee either (1) that a full evidentiary record will be made at the time of the original determination of guilt or innocence, thus permitting direct review, or
(2) that the defendant will be precluded by "waiver" doctrines
from raising certain errors that otherwise could become the subject of post-conviction proceedings. 35 The great increase in
34. Effective May 10, 1967, the Minnesota Post Conviction Remedy
Act, Mnx. STAT. § 590.01 (1967), became virtually the only method
available to attack the legality of a conviction except by a direct appeal.
Subdivision 2 of the Act provides that:
this remedy takes the place of any other common law, statutory
or other remedies which may have been available for challenging
the validity of a conviction, sentence, or other disposition and
must be used exclusively in place of them unless it is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the conviction, sentence or other disposition.
For a discussion of the Act's application and some problems it leaves
unresolved, see Comment, An Analysis of the Minnesota Post Conviction Remedy Statute, 52 An . L. REV. 732 (1968).
35. Most prominent among these cases are State ex rel. Rasmussen
v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 141 N.W.2d 3 (1965), and State v. Spreigl, 272
Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965). See 51 MInN. L. REv. 331 (1966).
In Rasmussen, the Court established the rule that before any evidence
relating either to a search and seizure or to a confession may be introduced by the prosecution, the defense must be given advance written
notice of the probable evidence. Failure by the accused to object to
the evidence and demand a pretrial hearing will ordinarily be held to
constitute a waiver. See 272 Minn. at 555, 141 N.W.2d at 14. In Spreig,
the Court constructed a similar procedure with respect to "other crimes"
evidence. The prosecution must notify the defendant a reasonable time
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the readiness of the United States Supreme Court and the Minnesota Supreme Court to limit the retroactive effect of new rulings favorable to criminal defendants doubtless has been of substantial additional assistance in sealing off the Court from postconviction appeals.3 6 Reportedly, 7 not a single instance of a
court's refusal to apply retroactively a new ruling of constitutional criminal law could be found prior to the United States
Supreme Court's 1965 decision of Linkletter v. Walker,38 yet
such a limitation has been applied in probably a majority of
"new" criminal law cases decided in the four years since passed.
prior to trial regarding the nature of the "other crimes" testimony to be
offered at trial. While no case has yet held that failure of the defense to
object to such evidence prior to trial constitutes a waiver, the same result will probably be reached by holding that the defendant had ample
time to prepare a rebuttal to the noted testimony. See also State v.
Grunau, 273 Minn. 315, 141 N.W.2d 815 (1966) (judicially imposed "Jencks
Act" procedure to require prosecution disclosure of prior testimony of
witness).
36. State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 544-52, 141
N.W.2d 3, 7-12 (1965), refused retroactive application of both Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (consultation with attorney required after
commencement of "accusatory" process), and Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368 (1964) (independent factual determination by trial judge required on admissibility of confession). In Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U.S. 719 (1966), the United States Supreme Court later reached
the same conclusion with respect to Escobedo. The extent to which
Jackson v. Denno will be applied to decisions that had become final
before it was decided seems unclear. Compare Stovell v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293, 298 (1967), with Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 544 (1967).
In State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 496, 139 N.W.2d 167, 173 (1965), the
procedure was said to be applicable only to ". . . the trial of this and
future criminal cases ..... " A more elaborate rule of limited retroactivity was propounded in State v. Grunau, 273 Minn. 315, 323-25,
141 N.W.2d 815, 822-23 (1966).
Other decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States refusing
to apply new and judicially developed rules of criminal procedure
retroactively include most prominently Berger v. California, U.S. (1969); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has also employed the prospectiveonly limitation in civil cases. See, e.g., Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419,
142 N.W.2d 66 (1966), commented on in 51 MINN. L. REV. 346 (1966);
In re Estate of Jeruzal, 269 Minn. 183, 130 N.W.2d 473 (1964); Note,
Prospective-ProspectiveOverruling, 51 Mmtx. L. REV. 79 (1966).
The most recent rash of literature on prospective-limitation is the
result of Linkletter v. Walker, supra, and the reaction to it in Mishkin,
Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of
Time and Law, 79 HARv. L. REv. 56 (1965). See also Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio,
110 U. PA. L. REv. 650 (1962); Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made
Law: Prospective Overruling,51 VA. L. REv. 201 (1965).
37. See Mishkin, supra note 36, at 56-57.
38. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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This means that for most persons whose convictions predated
the early 1960's the "criminal revolution" was being won elsewhere. An examination of the post-conviction appeals decided
by the Minnesota Supreme Court during the 1964-1968 period
bears this out. With certain notable exceptions, most of these
cases do not appear to have been brought by persons confined
under pre-1960 convictions. Insofar as prospects for relief of the
Supreme Court's docket are concerned this is a disappointment,
for it seems to dispel the hope that a significant portion of the
recent increase in criminal law decisions could be ascribed to
nonrecurrent attempts to review old convictions and under recent
and more favorable legal rules.
On balance, then, it appears that the pressure on the Court's
docket created by post-conviction review cases might have
"crested" just prior to and during the 1967-1968 Term.39 Because
of the present availability of what might be called finality-inducing devices and doctrines operating against the accused at the
trial level and in the original proceeding, it is doubtful that
many appeals from post-conviction relief proceedings will come
before the Court in this (1968-1969) or future Terms. One possibility that could reverse this decrease-and which can only be
a subject of speculation at this time-is that use of the habeas
corpus writ as a device to obtain betterment of prison and other
rehabilitative conditions will increase greatly. A general extension of such doctrines as procedural due process to prison disciplinary procedures, for example, together with availability of
the writ of habeas corpus to test compliance with these doctrines, 40 could well result in a substantial increase in post39. The timing of this development is ironical. In response to
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States substantially enlarging the circumstances under which state post-conviction review procedures would be considered inadequate and federal habeas corpus
made available, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293 (1963), many states, including Minnesota, enacted postconviction remedy statutes. These statutes substantially enlarged both
the types of errors that could be objected to after trial and the opportunities of the petitioning prisoner to obtain a plenary evidentiary
hearing.
40. The availability in these circumstances of the remedy provided by the habeas corpus statutes, MiNN. STAT. §§ 589.01-.30 (1967),
is a matter of some doubt. The Post-Conviction Remedy Act is clearly
unavailable. It is limited by Mnw. STAT. § 590.01, subd. 1 (1967), to
challenges to a "conviction, sentence, or other disposition." This appears
clearly to relate only to defects arising out of the original judgment
rather than to subsequent events alleged to make further incarceration
unlawful. Mm. STAT. § 589.01 (1967) (habeas corpus) speaks somewhat more broadly of "[e]very person imprisoned or otherwise re-
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conviction litigation by inmates. At present, however, it is probably fair to conclude that the post-conviction review remedies
present relatively little threat to the docket of the Supreme
Court.
(b)

Direct Criminal Appeals

In terms of subject matter, direct appeals from criminal
convictions constitute the largest bloc of cases to come before the
Court in its most recent Term.41 Here also, however, there
seems to be no compelling reason to conclude that the recent
rate of increase will continue inexorably into the future.42 To
be sure, there has been a recent rise in the number of criminal
proceedings initiated at the trial level;43 but there are reasons
to believe that there is no strict correlation between present trial
court filings of criminal proceedings and the future burden on
the Supreme Court. Many imponderables intervene. For one
strained of his liberty, except persons committed or detained by virtue
of the final judgment of any competent tribunal of civil or criminal
jurisdiction ...

."

Presumably, a person challenging the conditions of

his incarceration would already have exhausted his attacks upon the
original conviction, this then arguably bringing him within the "except"
language. Nonetheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court has shown a
marked degree of liberality in making the writ of habeas corpus available where the statute well might have been construed to be literally
inapplicable. See State ex rel. Holm v. Tahash, 272 Min. 466, 139 N.W.
2d 161 (1965).
41. See Table B supra at 948. See also the respective entries for
"Criminal Law" cases in the several Tables V infra at 1031, 1036, 1041
& 1046.
42. Compare note 28 supra, and the discussion there of the recent
Biennial Report of the Judicial Council.
43. In Minnesota, the number of new criminal case filings has recently fluctuated, and then joined a national rising trend. For figures
on the national trend see FBI, UNIFomw CRnwm REPORTS 1 (1967), and the
introductory "Summary" to similar reports in prior years. See generally
PEsIDENT's Comm'N ON LAW

ENFORCEMENT AND ADmINISTRATioN

OF

22-31, 154-57 (1967).
Figures prepared by the Administrative Assistant to the Supreme Court
show that there were 2250 new criminal cases filed throughout the state
in 1965 (excluding Ramsey County, for which figures were not available).
JUSTICE, CHALLENGE OF CaNIsE n

A

FREE SOCIET

During 1966, there were only 46 more filings for the same area, with a
total of 2752 when the 452 for Ramsey County are included. See
A )mINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT, THIRD

9 (1967).

ANNUAL REPORT ON MINNESOTA COURTS

There was a similar equilibrium in the number of criminal

case dispositions. Id. at 10. For 1967, the figures also remain relatively constant: 2926 new filings overall (including 479 in Ramsey
County). See FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 12. For 1968,

however, there seems to have been a rather substantial increase. For
the first six months, there were 1657 new filings, 258 more than in the
corresponding period of 1967. See JUmrcIAL CouxcL. REPORT, supra
note 3, at 11.
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thing, we operate today under a system of criminal justice that
is quite different from the system being employed even five
years, and certainly a decade, ago. New and more effective
programs are being instituted with the purpose of improving
the quality of criminal justice at the trial level.4 4 Through the
medium of rulings based only upon its "supervisory power to insure the fair administration of justice," the Court has itself guaranteed that counsel will be available, even to those accused only
of serious misdemeanors, if they are not otherwise able to afford
an attorney.45 Better trained and advised police forces hopefully will exercise greater care in the arrest and search of suspects. This could result in an increase in the number of cases
that do not remain contested beyond an initial trial hearing.
Trial judges, a few of them reluctantly, are also becoming better
informed about the rights of the criminally accused and are exercising greater caution to protect both the assertion and the vindication of their procedural rights. These and similar imponderables would seem to render highly speculative any rigid statistical projection of a continuing increase in the number of direct
criminal appeals in the years immediately ahead.
(c)

The Public Defender

From the Term just ended, one is tempted to conclude that
the blame for the glut of criminal appeals can be laid at the
Public Defender's doorstep. While such accusations are heard
from time to time, they are true only in a very qualified
measure. The Public Defender was involved in 86 of the criminal cases decided in 1967-1968, or in 28 per cent of all cases
44. It is believed by many that the Court has maintained a wise,
if occasionally overcautious, course in the area of criminal procedure. It
has shown a particular receptiveness to adopt, without legislative preordination, procedural arrangements calculated to lead to fairer, more
"final" criminal trials. See note 35 supra, and accompanying text. The
Court has also relied heavily upon several "model" codes of criminal
procedure, developed by committees of the American Bar Association.
See, e.g., cases cited note 112 infra. See also State v. Grunau, 273
Minn. 315, 325, 141 N.W.2d 815, 823 (1966).
45. See State v. Borst, 278 Mlinn. 388, 399, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894
(1967) (counsel must be afforded in any case where trial court might
impose jail sentence). The Court expressly refused to base its decision
upon either the federal or state constitution, apparently wishing to retain flexible control over the appointment of counsel in non-felony
cases. In part, the cost of providing counsel for indigent misdemeanants
is being borne by a privately funded grant to the State Public Defender
and by local government units. See JuDicIAL Couiqcn. REPORT, supra
note 3, at 6-7.
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decided during the Term. In each instance the Public Defender
was the petitioning party in the Supreme Court. Next to the

Attorney General's office,4 6 the Public Defender was by far
the single most familiar party to appear before the Court.
But to conclude from these figures that the Office of the Public
Defender alone has caused the present plight of the Supreme
Court-albeit in response to statutory, and perhaps constitutional, commands 47-would be unwarranted. For one thing,
even during the Public Defender's busiest year (1967-1968), almost one-third (32 per cent) of the criminal cases to come before
the Supreme Court were brought by others. Much more must be
known. How many of the non-Public Defender criminal cases
were those in which court-appointed attorneys (on average, notoriously slow in perfecting appeals) were finally obtaining judicial review of old cases? 48 Since the Supreme Court no longer
must appoint attorneys in most criminal appeals, what part of
the 1967-1968 criminal caseload represents a nonrecurrent phenomenon? How many of the criminal cases in which the Public
Defender appeared were "old" cases, either direct appeals or
post-conviction proceedings in which the court had been unsuccessful in obtaining appointed counsel and thus are also nonrecurrent? In short, how much of the Public Defender appellate
caseload is itself nonrecurrent? These and similar questions
have thus far received insufficient attention.
46. During the 1967-1968 Term, the office of the Attorney General appeared in cases resulting in 132 opinions, only 13 of which were
non-criminal. These 132 opinions represent 43 per cent of the Court's
total for the Term.
47. See text accompanying note 51 infra.
48. Prior to January 1, 1966, the Minnesota Supreme Court could
rely only upon its powers under MINN. STAT. § 611.071 (1967) to appoint
attorneys, and then only in felony cases. The ofice of the Public Defender began actively to represent indigent criminal appellants in the
Supreme Court on January 1, 1966. This representation extends to
any convicted person appealing directly or pursuing a post-conviction
remedy. See Ai=. STAT. § 611.25 (1967). After January 1, 1966, the
Public Defender assumed responsibility for many appeals that had
already been lodged with the Court but in which the Court had been
unsuccessful in obtaining appointed counsel. Since the Public Defender has been much more vigorous and effective in prosecuting appeals than were appointed counsel, it is quite probable that a "bunching" of criminal appeals occurred after January 1, 1966, caused by the
overlap of "new" criminal cases brought by the Public Defender and
"old" criminal cases handled at a more languid pace by appointed counsel. This bunching, if in fact it occurred, would be expected to affect
the statistics for criminal cases decided during the 1966-1967 Term and,
more significantly, during the 1967-1968 Term. If this hypothesis is correct, during the present (1968-1969) Term there should be a slight leveling off of the number of direct appeals brought by the Public Defender.
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Another possibility for shrinkage lies in a delicate area-that
of the Public Defender's standards for the selection of criminal
cases to appeal. During the 1967-1968 Term, the Public Defender
was successful in nine of the 86 decision in which he had represented the petitioner. 49 While a success rate of slightly over
10 per cent hardly ranks high among all groups of appellate
practitioners, the Public Defender labors under many and peculiar handicaps. Perhaps foremost among these is a policy,
thought to be dictated by the United States Supreme Court in
Anders v. California,5° that the Public Defender will accept
and prosecute an appeal even if the experienced judgment of the
Public Defender is that the appeal is probably not meritorious.5 1
This policy might stand as the single most significant imposition
upon the docket of the Minnesota Supreme Court, and remains a
major problem calling for further analysis, study and, possibly,
testing. It is perhaps even time to ask whether the problem will
always be confined to criminal cases. With the gradual expansion of legal aid services to impecunious civil litigants&2 -an
expansion that has been nurtured to some extent by a noteworthy attitude of liberality in the Minnesota Supreme Court it49. Based on compilation from private data.
50. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
51. I here make no pretense of quoting or even closely paraphrasing the stated policy of the office of the Public Defender. I am conveying only my estimate of what the policy has produced, in a substantial
number of instances, as exemplified by appellate opinions. I appreciate
that an appellate opinion might distort or wholly fail to mention a
meritorious point upon which the appeal was based; that intervening
legal developments can emasculate what was a tenable position at the
time of briefing and/or argument; that a consensus on how to define a
"meritorious" point of criminal law, particularly in light of fast-changing legal rules, might be impossible to attain; and that the Public
Defender, unlike "private" attorneys, does not have broad discretion in
advising clients not to pursue litigation. I also appreciate that the opinion in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), can be read to preelude the exercise of any independent judgment. Nonetheless, on the
basis of some of the cases decided, my suspicion is that improvements
can be made. Finally, I certainly do not believe that anyone other
than the particular attorney handling an appeal for the Public Defender's office has the power to decide whether or not that attorney should

handle an appeal.

52. This still modest expansion has occurred chiefly through the
growth of existing legal aid clinics in the Minneapolis, St. Paul and
Duluth metropolitan areas, financed mainly through "community fund"
donations and foundation grants. In addition, the University of Minne-

sota Law School operates a student legal aid office that traditionally

dealt mainly with legal problems of indigent students. Recently it
has expanded its program to include extensive cooperation with the
metropolitan legal aid clinics.
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self 5 -- the day may soon come when the United States Supreme
Court or, more unlikely, the Minnesota Supreme Court, will be
asked to extend the same kind of automatic-appeal privilege to
certain kinds of civil litigants. A similar requirement that all
but "wholly frivolous" 54 cases be taken to the Court, if applied
to any significant portion of the civil litigation conducted-and,
analogously to cases appealed after the entry of pre-arranged
guilty pleas, including a corresponding percentage of civil actions settled prior to litigation 5-would require the Court to
53.

See, e.g., In re Karren, 280 Minn. 137, 159 N.W.2d 402 (1968)

(county ordered to underwrite cost of transcript to indigent mother
whose parental rights had been terminated), overruling Munkelwitz v.
Hennepin County Welfare Dep't, 276 Minn. 554, 150 N.W.2d 24 (1967).
Compare Jenswold v. St. Louis County Welfare Bd., 247 Minn. 60, 76
N.W.2d 639 (1956).

See also State v. Freitag,

-

Minn. __, 161 N.W.2d

530 (1968) (permitting waiver of bond on appeal in criminal case from
justice court to district court); authorities cited supra note 45. Certainly an expansion of economic equal protection doctrines by the
United States Supreme Court would lead to an "explosion" of civil indigent cases similar to the wave of criminal litigation that began in the
early 1960's. See generally Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Electors, 383 U.S.
663 (1966); Note, Discrimination Against the Poor and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 81 HARv.L. REv. 435 (1967).
54. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
55. Only the number of civil jury cases settled are available for
cases in the district courts (no comparable figures being available for
the number of settled civil non-jury cases). Based on reports of the
Administrative Assistant to the Supreme Court [THIRD ANN AL REPORT,
supra note 43, at 9 (Table IV), 12 (Table IX) (for 1965); id. at 12
(Tables IX-X) (for 1966); FOuRTH ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 15
(Tables IX-X) (for 1967)], the following table has been compiled:
TABLE C

District Court Civil Jury Dispositions
Settled

Total

Year

Total

Before Trial

9759

8411

7414

997

86.7

10,092

8754

7848

906

86.7

8522

9854

1965
1966
Three-Year
Average

7662

8468

9329

10,664

1967

During Trial Percentage

Terminated

860

861

86.5
87.5

For a comparable period, the number and types of dispositions in
the district courts of criminal cases are as follows, see AnlmrvsTmATmVE
ASSISTANT, SEcoND ANNUAL REPORT ON IumESOTA CouRTs 23-24 (1966)
(for 1965 but not including Ramsey County figures which were unavailANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 22 (for 1966); FouRTH
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 24 (for 1967):

able); THn
Year

TABLE D
District Court Criminal Case Dispositions
Court
Trial

Tur

Dismissed

Guilty
Plea

2207

115(5.2)

209(9.5)

285(12.9)

1585(71.8)

2606
2779

139(5.3)
180(6.5)

224(8.6)
283(10.2)

408(15.7)
504(18.1)

1835(70.4)
1812(65.2)

2531

145(5.7)

239(9.4)

399(15.8)

1744(68.9)

Terminated

1965
1966
- 67
Three-Year
Average
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deal with a vastly expanded caseload. 56
2. Civil Cases
(a)

Tort-based Appeals
Aside from direct appeals in criminal cases, the most important category of cases pressing for decision consists of tortbased cases: appeals involving automobile and other types of
personal injury and property damage, and appeals from the Industrial Commission under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
In fact, if all the automobile-related cases-except criminal cases
in which an automobile played a major part-are excluded from
Table V of the 1967-1968 Term, this would decrease the number
of decisions by 37.57 Of these, 25 would have been the familiar

type of automobile negligence action, most of which were appealed on points of evidence sufficiency. If the 16 (non-automobile) appeals from the Industrial Commission are included, the
personal injury bar can claim credit for about 53 cases before the
Court during the 1967-1968 Term, or roughly 17 per cent of its
burden. 58 Actually, a thorough study of the yearly caseload will
show that the 1967-1968 Term load of automobile cases represents a percentage decline. In 1964-1965, for example, 39 automobile cases and 22 workmen's compensation cases were decided,
representing about 29 per cent of the caseload. 9
For the number of criminal appeals during the 1967-1968 Term and
the percentage of these that stemmed from convictions based on a plea
of guilty, see note 33 supra, and accompanying text.
56. Employing an admittedly questionable method of projection,
a very rough comparison can be ventured. For the three-year period

of 1965-1967, there was an average of 2531 criminal cases terminated in
the district courts. See Table D, note 55 supra. During the same period,

the average number of civil cases terminated in the district courts was
10,092. See Table C, note 55 supra. During the four Terms from October, 1964, to September, 1968, there was an average of 82.5 criminal
cases decided in the Supreme Court. See Table B, supra at 948. At a

hypothetical ratio of civil appeals to civil dispositions correspondent to
the actual ratio of criminal appeals to criminal dispositions, there would
have been approximately 329 civil appeals decided in the Supreme
Court, on the average, during each of the Terms from 1964 through
1968, instead of the average 166.8 civil cases that actually were decided
on appeal during those Terms. Id. The resulting total average annual

caseload for each year of this period would, hypothetically, have been
411.5.
57. Based on compilation from private data.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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The decline during the 1967-1968 Term in both absolute number and relative percentage of personal injury claims is encouraging, especially as these types have traditionally represented
about 50-75 per cent of the cases tried at the nisi prius level. 60
Nonetheless, the remaining number of such cases can only be
described as excessive when weighed against their importance.
The study of the Minnesota Supreme Court's decisions between
1964 and 1968 attempted to isolate the "principal issue" that occupied the writer of the majority opinion. Although the data is
not yet in a form permitting an accurate count, it would appear
that a very great percentage of the personal injury appeals
present as their principal issue the question whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict or the trial
judge's finding.61 While experienced appellate judges doubtless
have acquired a facility for deciding such cases, their disposition
must still consume at least as much time as the average of all
cases. It should be apparent that personal injury attorneys are
either unable or unwilling to exercise greater restraint in bringing such cases before the Court. Any decrease probably must
come from self-restraint by the Court in refusing to become so
embroiled in such issues. This restraint could perhaps be supplemented by special techniques such as requiring submission of
60. Accurate figures for Minnesota are unavailable. For a discussion of statistics in New York City, see Rosenberg & Sovern,
Delay and the Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation, in DOLLARS,
DELAY AND THE AUTOMOBIrE VIcTim 79 (1968). See also 1967 DIRECTOR
OF THE ADAN. OFFICE OF TnE U.S. CouRTs,

AiNx. REP. 210-11; Table

C3 in prior annual reports.

61. Implicit in this statement, of course, is the judgment that evidence-sufficiency issues ordinarily should rank low on the order of
priorities an ideal court would construct. That judgment apparently
is not shared entirely by some members of the Minnesota Supreme
Court, although vague rumblings of discontent are heard from time to

time. See Loewe v. City of Le Sueur, 277 Minn. 94, 98, 151 N.W.2d 777,
780 (1967); Kvanli v. Village of Watson, 272 Minn. 481, 486, 139 N.W.2d
275, 280 (1965). Mine is hardly a new or unique position, however. See,
e.g., Pirsig, The Work of The Minnesota Supreme Court, 25 M=. L.
REV. 821, 829, 841, 844-47 (1941). While it is true that the appellate bar,
if I may call it that, has been blameworthy for failing to sift out these
kinds of cases, id. at 847, the Court is also subject to criticism for
encouraging such appeals by taking great pains to deal with evidencesufficiency issues. Ordinarily, the Court must reserve its energies, if it

would use them well, for dealing at length and with effort only with the
issues that will have a formulary effect-an effect upon the shape of
the law. It is appreciated that an argument can be made that questions

of fact sometimes have a unique importance in the shaping of legal rules,
see, e.g., Note, Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV.
994, 1070 (1965), and authorities cited, but this is a rarity and the resulting effect is probably slight.
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evidence-sufficiency issues without oral argument and in briefs
of a limited number of pages, with decisions in short paragraphs
or in short, per curiam opinions.
(b) Other Civil Appeals
Aside from the personal injury cases, no other category of
civil cases seems to present disproportionate demands upon the
time and effort of the Court. As well as such matters can be
measured impressionistically, the number of cases in these
other categories in Table V 62 seems roughly representative of
the importance of each category. 'When one turns to the reason
why cases in any category have been brought to the court, however, such a satisfying impression is diminished. It seems that
many of these cases were appealed and/or disposed of on trifling
issues. More is involved here than evidence-sufficiency issues, although those are the most frequently encountered. Another prominent example, in civil cases, is the seemingly labyrinthine rules governing the appealability of trial court orders. 3
Whether because of the inherent complexity of these rules, the
obtuseness of counsel, the suspicion that the Supreme Court can
be persuaded to make ad hoc exceptions 4 or a combination of
62. Infra at-1031, 1036, 1041 & 1046.
63. The entire subject of appealable orders in civil cases has been
admirably treated in a recent student work. Note, Appealable Orders, Prohibition, and Mandamus in Minnesota, 51 MIhN. L. REV. 115
(1966). See also the local classic, Cunningham, Appealable Orders in
Minnesota,37 ATn. L. REv. 309 (1953).
64. A sampling among only the more recent of such cases will
sufficiently demonstrate the inconsistent, frequently promiscuous attitude that the Court has taken either toward questions of its own jurisdiction or, what is only a slightly different matter, toward the jurisdiction of the trial courts. See National Surety Corp. v. Schwandt, 279
Minn. 444, 446, 157 N.W.2d 506, 507 (1968) (passing over issue of jurisdiction of district court on untimely application for agency review);

Reuben E. Johnson Co. v. Phelps, 279 Minn. 107, 118, 156 N.W.2d 247,
254 (1968) (10 of 19 cases "affirmed" without passing on common issue
of reviewability of respective 10 judgments); In re Jury Panel Selected
for Dakota County, 276 Minn. 503, 507, 150 N.W.2d 863, 866 (1967) (improper plaintiffs and probably no justiciable controversy; merits considered); State v. J.P. Sinna & Sons, Inc., 271 Mlinn. 430, 435, 136 N.W.2d
666, 669 (1965) (order appealed from nonappealable; merits nonetheless
ruled on); cf. Beatty v. Winona Housing & Redevelopment Auth., 277
Minn. 76, 82, 86, 151 N.W.2d 584, 588, 590 (1967) (in spite of clear finding of no appellate jurisdiction, passing to question of parties; then, in
spite of finding of lack of proper party plaintiff in declaratory judgment
action, passing to strong intimation of merits). With the above, contrast cases such as State ex rel. Ryan v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 278 Minn.
296, 301, 154 N.W.2d 192, 196 (1967):

".

.

. Our writ of certiorari is

statutory and the statutory provisions must be strictly construed . . ."
(affirming district court dismissal of action accompanied by defective
bond).
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these, it seems that rules of appealability are producing a great
deal of uncertainty and resulting appellate litigation. 5 Viewed
against the unmistakable magnitude of other problems in the
modern world, perhaps there is no pressing societal interest in
having rules of appealability settled one way or another; but
there does seem to be an urgent need-in terms of the time
available for case disposition on the basis of rules and principles
governing extra-litigation behavior-for these rules to be settled
and capable of more certain application.
3.

Questions About the Court'sProcesses

Beyond the suggested excision of many of the personal injury appeals and other cases essentially concerning the appealability of the trial court's action, there seems to be no other major area in which substantial economies could be effected. But
this is to mention only the raw material upon which the Court
operates, and much of the dyseconomy of the Court's present
operations might stem from the process it applies to these materials. Here, several questions can be raised. Could the Court
fulfill its functions while reducing by half the average length of
its opinions?0 6 Is there any further justification, other than
65. A rough count indicates that the issue of the appealability of a
trial court order was the "principal issue" in about a dozen of the 179
civil appeals decided by the Court during the 1967-1968 Term. See
Table B, supra at 948. Given the protocol under which the study of
the Supreme Court has thus far been conducted, see note 14 supra,
and accompanying text, it could be expected that the issue would have
arisen in perhaps one-third of the civil appeals, but in such a way that
it would not have been deemed "principal." As a handy example, in
State v. J.P. Sinna & Sons, Inc., 271 Minn. 430, 136 N.W.2d 666 (1965),
after the Court decided that the case was not appealable, it went on to
consider the merits at great length, thus making the remaining discussion the most prominent issue in the case.
The Sinna case also serves as a working model of one important
reason for any appellate court to avoid unnecessary exercises of its
powers, especially where there is a clear absence of jurisdiction. The
opinion in the original Sinna appeal first concluded that the appeal was
premature and thus nonappealable. The opinion nonetheless went on to
discuss the merits and stated in unmistakably clear language that certain assets in the hands of a mortgagee were subject to the state's tax
lien. Id. at 436, 136 N.W.2d at 670. On remand the trial court, in obvious commanded obedience to the language noted, entered judgment for
the state. On appeal by the mortgagee, and now characterizing the language in the prior opinion as "dictum," the Court was compelled to
reverse on a "holding" that the property involved was not taxable.
State v. Industrial Credit Co., 280 Minn. 404, 159 N.W.2d 774 (1968).
66. In the survey conducted of the opinions written by the Court
during the four Terms from October, 1964 to September, 1968, see page
942 supra, each opinion was measured by inches as it appeared in the
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forgotten history, for the Court to be required by statute 7 to
prepare a separate syllabus for each case decided? Has the Court
been sufficiently restrained about exercising its jurisdiction in
doubtful or clearly prohibited areas, thus discouraging litigants
from appealing cases that are unready or otherwise inappropriate
for appellate review? 68 Has the Court made full and effective
use of the per curiam opinion as a means of reducing the time
needed to produce opinions? 9 Do the Rules of the Court and
its attitude in enforcing them impel attorneys to submit briefs
70
and arguments maximally effective for the Court's purposes?
Answering these and like questions must remain for the
unofficial Northwestern Reporter, Second Series, to provide uniform
measurements and ready availability of recent decisions. Correlations
between the length of opinions and the "principal issue" discussed,
note 65 supra, the subject-matter of the action in the trial court, and
the identity of the petitioning party and whether or not he was successful, see Table V, infra at 1031, 1036, 1041 & 1046, have not yet been
run. An initial impression, however, is that many opinions are overlong, some grossly so. The extent to which this leads to a waste of
judicial man-hours is not known. Conceivably, it could lead under certain circumstances to a conservation of effort if the over-length of the
opinion was attributable to reprinting lengthy portions of the record to
spare justices other than the opinion-writer the necessity of resorting to
the record to see that nothing has been overlooked. While this justification seems feeble, I can think of none other. See, e.g., State v. Warren,
278 Minn. 119, 121-128, 153 N.W.2d 273, 274-78 (1967) (footnote, stretching over three pages of reduced-size print, quoting apparently entire
proceedings at entry of guilty plea); State v. Kramer, 272 Minn. 454,
456-460, 139 N.W.2d 374, 375-78 (1965) (three pages of text quoting arraignment proceedings).
67. See Mn. STAT. § 480.06 (1967).
68. See notes 64 & 65 supra. It is, of course, problematical whether
decisions such as those noted in fact lead attorneys to raise appeals of
doubtful jurisdiction more readily than they would otherwise. From
one's armchair, it is difficult to believe that it does not contribute, in
ways too subtle perhaps for measurement, to some increase in the
number of cases that the Court must decide.
69. See generally State v. Schmeck, 280 Minn. 561, 159 N.W.2d 772
(1968) (purely factual issue on understanding waiver of constitutional
right); State v. Lopez, 280 Minn. 553, 158 N.W.2d 502 (1968) (evidencesufficiency on issue of guilt in simple robbery case); Planck v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 274 Minn. 561, 143 N.W.2d 641 (1966) (adopting
in per curiam opinion, the memorandum opinion written by the trial
court in "easy" case). Assuming that the issues were presented with
candor, if briefly, each of these cases was quite correctly dispatched
without full formal opinion. Similar treatment would also be urged
for similar types of cases. See note 61 supra.
70. One hears it reported on every hand that the art of advocacy
is seldom encountered in the hearings of oral argument in the Supreme Court. A workman-like brief is similarly rare. Whether a
massive educational effort, the tightening of sanctions or the rigid imposition of those existing would improve these situations markedly is
unknown,
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future. The present purpose is to direct attention toward possible or probable areas where improvements could be made. To
reiterate,71 it is doubtful that anything said thus far could fairly
be taken to prejudice the question of the wisdom or utility of any
current proposal for such improvement. In light of the data
generated to date, however, it seems safe to conclude only that
more must be known before sound and mature judgments can
be reached. Others will judge whether the situation is such that
no time is available for additional research before innovations
are attempted.
Innovation has, of course, already occurred in an attempt to
relieve the individual justices of the Supreme Court of some of
the burden of participating in the hearing and decision of appeals.
I speak here of the arrangement, in effect during the last nine
months of the 1967-1968 Term, of hearing and deciding certain
pre-selected cases by divisions of the Court. Because the survey
of the Court's operations during 1964-1968 has revealed certain
aspects of this new system that require discussion and prompt
correction and, more broadly, for whatever light a discussion of
this system might shed on the continuing problem of applying
correctives to the Court's caseload, the divisional system will next
be considered.
III.

A.

THE COURT'S RESPONSE TO AN INCREASING
CASELOAD

CoMamssioNm

ApPOInTmENTS

There are few options available to the Court in dealing with
its caseload pressure. It exercised one of them in 1963 when Mr.
Justice Frank T. Gallagher was appointed as "commissioner" to
aid the Court in preparing opinions. The appointment followed
by one day his retirement because of age from regular membership as an associate justice.72 Mr. Justice Gallagher brought
71.

See supra page 943.

72. For the retirement of Mr. Justice Gallagher, his appointment
as commissioner and the appointment of Mr. Justice Sheran as a regular
member to succeed him, see The Supreme Court of Minnesota, 264
Minn. iii (1963). AMniN. STAT. § 490.025, subd. 5 (1967), provides for the
appointment by the Supreme Court itself of a retired justice as commissioner ".... to aid and assist in the performance of such of its
duties as may be assigned to him with his consent." Pursuant to this
provision, a retired justice sitting as a commissioner exercised no vote
on cases and ordinarily would sit only on cases to which he had previously been assigned. (I forego for the present the temptation to vent
displeasure at the practice of assigning an opinion-writer prior to hearing oral argument.) Beginning with the start of the statutory term of
the Court in January, 1967, the status of Mr. Justice Gallagher's ap-
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to the seven-man Court 16 years' experience as an associate justice.73 From 1963 to the present, Mr. Justice Gallagher's assistance has been crucial. As the figures for each Term in Table
I illustrate, 74 in spite of advanced years and the need to stay
abreast of a mobile and complex legal landscape, he has continued to be a productive opinion-writer. In three of the four
terms from 1964 to 1968, he has written more opinions than the
Chief Justice and at least one of the associate justices. In part,
this productivity is ascribable to the fact that until January,
1968, Mr. Justice Gallagher attended oral argument only when
assigned to write the Court's opinion. This also made it unnecessary for him to attend conferences, to read briefs and records
and to draft opinions in cases on which he did not sit.
B.

DivisioNAL SnTrmGs

Another alternative in responding to the recent increase in
its caseload was given the Court in 1957 when the legislature
authorized consideration of cases by divisions of less than the
entire membership. 75 Inspired by a desire to increase the productivity of each justice, 6 the Supreme Court on October 3, 1967,
adopted Rule 135 of the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, the
text of which is quoted in the margin.77 This divisional
pointment was modified. He was assigned "temporarily" by the Court
to sit as an "associate justice." The word "temporarily" is used in
Mim. STAT. § 2.724 (1964), pursuant to which the assignment was made.
Whether the word means "indefinitely" is one debatable question.
Whether the statute contemplates such an assignment even when all
regular members are functioning and sitting is another. An indefinite
appointment would seem to raise more than a minor constitutional
question under MxmN. CONST. art. VI, § 8, providing for limited six-year
terms and requiring popular election of "all judges." A purposeful legislative expansion of the size of the Court to as many as nine full-time
members would be constitutional. See id. § 1. But at this point Mrnw.
STAT. § 480.01 (1967), stating that "... the supreme court shall consist
of one chief justice and six associate justices ..

. " would seem to

create a problem in finding such a purposeful expansion. Finally, it
would also seem debatable whether the absence of a formal vote on
the actual decision of a case would be enough to place the indefinite assignment of a retired justice under § 2.724 outside the constitutional
scheme (whatever its merit) for the popular election of judges.
73. Mr. Justice Gallagher was first elected on November 5, 1946, for
a term as associate justice beginning January 6, 1947. The Supreme
Court of Minnesota, 223 Minn. iii (1947).
74. See infra at 1028, 1033, 1038 & 1043.
75. M_ . STAT. § 2.724, subd. 2 (1967).
76. See the remarks prepared by Mr. Chief Justice Knutson and
appearing in Appellate Review by Divisions, MxNl-., BENcH & BAR,
Nov., 1967, at 6-7.
77. (1) Cases set for oral argument or submitted on the briefs
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scheme was in operation for nine months of the 1967-1968 Term,
producing sufficient data to warrant study and comment.

will be heard either en banc or by a division of the court. The
Chief Justice will sit with each division and will assign 4 associate justices, including any retired justice serving pursuant to
Minnesota Statutes, Section 2.724, Subd. 2, to sit as a division
of the court to hear and decide cases assigned to such division.
The assignment of associate justices will be made on a rotating
basis and may be changed as may be required by disqualification or illness of a justice.
(2) The administrative assistant to the court is hereby designated as a referee of the court for the purpose of reviewing
the record, transcript, and briefs in all cases and submitting to
all justices of the court his recommendations for the classification of cases for assignment to the en banc or to a division
calendar, according to the legal and judicial significance of the
issues raised. Any one justice of the court may order a case to
be placed on the en banc calendar rather than a division calendar. The Chief Justice, in his discretion and according to the
requirements of composing the calendar, shall accept, reject, or
revise the recommended classification of cases. Thereafter, the
clerk shall prepare the calendar.
(3) The decision of a case by a division of the court shall
be by the concurrence of four justices. If four justices do not
concur in the decision, the case shall be re-set for an en bane
hearing. A copy of the tentative written opinion of a division
in each case, prior to filing with the clerk, shall be circulated
among the justices who did not sit on the case, and any two
justices of the court by questioning the decision, may signify
their doubt as to the decision of the division, in which event the
case, at a further conference of the court, may be re-set for
an en banc hearing. An en banc hearing under this paragraph
shall be scheduled at the earliest practicable date, at which
hearing the argument time allotted by Rule 134 shall not apply,
but counsel for the parties will appear to answer legal or factual questions posed by the court. No additional briefs need
be filed unless requested by the court.
At the risk of appearing querulous, I must point out what appears
to have been another instance of disarray in the rules governing the
Court's operations. See also notes 3 & 72 supra. This involves an
obvious drafting oversight in the scheme set up by Rule 135. The rule
appears, of course, as one of the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure.
The first of these Civil Rules, Rule 101, states quite plainly that "these
rules" govern the procedure in "civil appeals." If this were not enough,
we have it on unimpeachable authority that "the rules apply to civil
proceedings only." Mr. Justice Sheran, Summary of 1968 Amendments
to Rules of Civil Procedure, in 27A Mir. STAT. AwN. viii (1968).
Finally, scrutiny of the text of Rule 135, above, fails to disclose any
intimation that the rule is to apply beyond the limits imposed generally by Rule 101 for all of the appellate rules. Yet it is unmistakably
clear from the Court's practices that Rule 135 divisions are being used
in criminal appeals. Of the 104 opinions resulting from divisional sittings of the Court since Rule 135 was put into effect, until the end of
the 1967-1968 Term, 50 were criminal appeals. While it is doubtful that
this drafting lapse should require any kind of rehearing in any criminal case heard only by a division (because of the probable absence of
prejudice to the accused), it would clearly seem advisable to clarify the
application of Rule 135 to such cases.
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The Mechanics of RuZe 135

Under Rule 135 all cases coming before the Court are first
reviewed and classified by the Administrative Assistant.78 Those
70
cases considered to be of "less legal and judicial significance" )
are assigned for divisional consideration while those considered
more significant are assigned for hearing en banc. A single justice can insist that a case assigned for divisional hearing be redesignated for hearing en banc. The Chief Justice possesses the
power to accept, reject or modify the Administrative Assistant's
classification.8 0
The Court's clerk prepares two calendars, one for divisional
hearings, another for en banc hearings. The Chief Justice then
assigns to each of the divisional cases four associate justices
who, together with himself, sit for argument and decision of
the case. The Rule states that the associate justices are to be
selected on a "rotating" basis, so that the free time created by
absence from a divisional sitting will be equally apportioned to
each. 1 Significantly, the Rule also states that a retired justice
78. The primary function contemplated for the Administrative Assistant to the Supreme Court was to serve as a coordinator and expeditor of the work of the state trial courts and, quite secondarily, of
the Supreme Court. See MNw. STAT. § 480.15 (1967). The distraction
of the Administrative Assistant from these pressing duties by making up
the Supreme Court's calendar is regrettable.
79. MINN. R. Civ. APP. P. 135(2) [hereinafter cited as Rule 135].
Surely the Administrative Assistant must operate under guidelines more
informative than that stated in Rule 135 (2). From the statistics alone, it
appears that certain kinds of criminal cases might be considered prime
objects for divisional treatment. It is also probable that the Administrative Assistant operates with a rough ratio in mind of divisional
cases and en banc cases. Such a ratio would largely reflect the state
of the backlog of cases and the pressures to liquidate it. See also notes
105-114 infra, and accompanying text.
80. Although the point probably would never seriously arise, the
calendaring provisions of new Rule 135 are ambiguous as to the relative powers of the Chief Justice and any associate justice. It is unclear
whether the Rule contemplates that the Chief Justice should have the
power to overrule an associate justice's reclassification of a case from
the divisional calendar to the en banc calendar in addition to the power
to reject the Administrative Assistant's suggested classifications. Such
an interpretation is doubtful, although the language of Rule 135(2),
standing alone, would support either that interpretation or its negative.
But see Knutson, supra note 76, at 7:
If any one justice feels that a case has been erroneously
classified [by the administrative assistant?] as a divisions case,
he has the right to place the case on the en banc calendar of
the court. The Chief Justice will make the ultimate determination of whether a particular case will be heard en banc or
by a division ....

81. Rule 135(1).

There is no indication, in Rule 135 or elsewhere,
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sitting pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 2.724, subdivision

2, may be assigned to a division.8 2 This has meant that Mr. Justice Gallagher has become virtually a full member of the Court
with respect to divisional sittings. 83 This, however, has created
other problems. 84
While perhaps the least disruptive method of coping with
an expanded docket, the divisional system must inevitably result
in a substantial diminution of collegial interaction among members of the Court. It is probable that most justices will virtually
ignore all but the major outlines of most division decisions in
which they did not take part. 5 Unfortunately, most members of the Court perceive themselves as primarily opiniondraftsmen, and are determined to reduce the number of distractions from this task. Whether the quality of the decisional
process can be maintained with such emphasis upon individual
resolution of legal issues is questionable. Nonetheless, as it is
likely that the divisional system will survive for a number of
years at least, rather substantial modifications, both in design
and in operation, seem required.
2.

Assignment of Justices to Divisions

Rule 135 states that the assignment of associate justices to
divisions will be made "on a rotating basis," with such adjustment as absence or recusal may require.8 6 It would seem necesthat any associate justice is to have the power to affect the alignment of
any particular division after its composition is determined by the Chief
Justice. In practice, of course, any suggestion or objection by an associate justice would be expected to be resolved informally. See note
93 infra, and accompanying text.
82. Rule 135(1).
83. During the 1967-1968 Term (in only nine months of which
the divisional rule was operative), Mr. Justice Gallagher was indicated in opinions as having been a member of 59 divisions and as having
signed 19 opinions for the Court en banc, for a minimum total of 78
sittings out of the 306 decisions rendered during the Term. See Table I,
1967-1968 Term, infra at 1043. Mr. Justice Gallagher wrote opinions
in 15 of the 78 divisions of which he was a member.
84. See infra at 970-73.
85. Even with the absences permitted by the division system, during the nine months of its operation in the 1967-1968 Term, the associate justices participated in roughtly 10 more cases during that Term
than each did during the 1964-1965 and 1966-1967 Terms. See Table
III infra at pages 1029, 1034, 1039 & 1044 (figures "N").
See also Pirsig, supra note 61, at 837-39, for a description of the
practices of the less burdened Supreme Court of a generation ago with
respect to placing upon the justice drafting the opinion the "major responsibility" for doing the preparatory spade work.
86. Rule 135(1).
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sary that a rotation system accomplish at least two essential
functions: (1) permitting each justice an equal amount of
"free" time by absence from divisional sittings; and (2) ensuring
that each justice sits with every other justice roughly an equal
number of times. In the nine months of the 1967-1968 Term,
during which the divisional system was in operation, 255 decisions were released, 151 by the full Court, and 104 by divisions.8 7 As contemplated by the Rule, Chief Justice Knutson sat
on all divisions. Justice Nelson was absent from 40 divisions;
Justices Rogosheske, Sheran, Peterson and Gallagher from 45
divisions; and Justices Murphy and Otis from 46 divisions."
Thus, each associate justice was afforded roughly an equal
amount of additional time for the preparation of opinions, the
major purpose of the innovation.
In sharp contrast, however, analysis of the figures in Table
III for the 1967-1968 Term discloses a much greater disparity in
the extent to which any one associate justice sits with certain of
his colleagues. To take the most extreme example, Justice Rogosheske sat on divisions with Justice Peterson a total of 50 times
and with Justice Otis only 16 times.8 9 While it is virtually inconceivable that such a Balkanization of the Court is intentional,
it is a matter that requires immediate correction. The circu87. These figures are derived from data given in Table II, 19671968 Term, infra at 1043, and from private data. It should be noted
that an undetermined number of the en banc decisions released after
January 2, 1968, were heard prior to the effective date of the Rule.
Thus, considerably fewer than 151 opinions probably resulted from post1967 en banc hearings, perhaps only as many as 100-125.
88. See Table I, 1967-1968 Term, infra page 1043.
89. To determine the number of times that any justice was absent
from a division on which any other justice sat, take the larger number
appearing in parentheses at the appropriate column in Table I, 19671968 Term, infra page 1044, and substract it from 104, the number of
division opinions released during the 1967-1968 Term. See note 87
supra, and accompanying text.
The divisional system was in operation for only three-quarters of
the 1967-1968 Term, thus there could be a slight amount of distortion
of the statistics. It might be noted that, at least with respect to some of
the more egregious instances involving isolated pairs of justices, there
is some correspondence between a high figure resulting from the above
computation and the figure given in the appropriate column "T" for
those justices in Table III for the four Terms infra at 1029, 1034, 1039
& 1044 and in the same place in the similar compilation from prior
Terms. See Supreme Court Notes cited supra note 18. The correspondence is far from persuasive of anything other than inadvertence, of
course, and hardly operates in most cases. Moreover, the figures for
"T" given for any justice for any Term are too low to be suggestive of
deep disagreements among justices. The figures raise only a spectre;
they do not unearth a skeleton.
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lation of all division opinions among those justices who did not
sit at oral argument 90 is doubtless intended to prevent them from
losing whatever influence upon the Court's activities they would
have had if the case had been heard en banc. But this is hardly
an adequate guarantee that bloc voting will not occur.9 1 First,
the justices likely give less attention to the opinions of divisions
on which they did not sit and thus are unlikely to form a forceful position on such cases. Second, there is no formalized procedure for either consultation or exchange of memoranda to
elicit the views of the non-sitting justices. Without such a procedure it is doubtful that much interchange occurs. Third,
Rule 135(3) provides that objections by both sitting and nonsitting justices be to the proposed "decision" of the division. It
is not clear whether the choice of this term rather than "opinion"
was intentional. If "decision" means only the ultimate disposition of the case, then the non-sitting justices would be relegated
to passing upon only ultimate disposition rather than exercising
the additional judicial function of scrutinizing decisional language.92 Assurances have been given, however, that the language means that the requisite number of non-sitting justices
-or a combination of a non-sitting justice with a dissenting
member of the division-may compel a rehearing en banc by
"... express [ing] a doubt as to the correctness of the decision
or the propriety of the language of the opinion . . . ."93 None90. See Rule 135(3). See also Knutson, supra note 76, at 6, 8.
91. Fears might also be entertained about Balkanization of a
slightly different kind-the assignment of certain kinds of cases to a
certain group of justices sitting together on divisions that are convened
for the specialized purpose of hearing such cases. So far as present information permits a conclusion, it appears that this has not occurred.
Moreover, Chief Justice Knutson has given the assurance that "...
rotation will take place frequently so that the same five justices will
not repeat as a division except through ordinary numerical chance ....
Knutson, supra note 76, at 6.
92. Some probably would argue that there has been a traditional
willingness on the part of most justices on the Court to go along with
both language and result proposed by opinion-drafting brethren, even if
with private reservations. If this is accurate, Rule 135 would not constitute a departure from established custom if it were to relegate language objections to a quite secondary position. See Table I for each
Term, infra at 1028, 1033, 1038 & 1043. In this regard, see State v.
Johnson, 277 Minn. 368, 375, 152 N.W.2d 529, 533 (1967), where the
unknown draftsman of a "per curiam" opinion reported that a "majority" of justices favored a new trial because of the insufficiency of evidence of culpability. The opinion failed to elicit any dissenting or specially concurring opinion or in any other way indicate which justices
were in the majority.
93. Knutson, supra note 76, at 8. Actually, after a necessary number of objections to either the opinion or disposition, the case is
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theless, there remains serious obstacles to actual full-court participation in each decision.
The problems regarding appointment of divisional justices
are heightened by the question of the appropriate role for a retired justice sitting pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 2.724,
subdivision 2. As mentioned previously, in January, 1967, Mr.
Justice Gallagher was assigned to sit as an "associate justice,"
rather than as a "commissioner."'19 The statute provides that
the Court ". . . may by rule assign temporarily any retired justice of the supreme court or duly appointed commissioner of
said court, or one district judge at a time to act as a justice of
the supreme court. . . ."5 I do not know whether Mr. Justice
Gallagher presently is exercising a vote in divisional decisions. 96
But whether he is or not problems are presented.
Assume, first, that the terms of Mr. Justice Gallagher's appointment contemplate that he possesses a divisional vote. This
is an interpretation more consistent with the language of Rule
135(1) which states that the Chief Justice and four associates,
including a retired justice sitting pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 2.724, subdivision 2, shall ". . . sit as a division of
the court to hear and decide cases assigned to such division
....
,,
Would appointment of a retired justice with voting
power be permissible under section 2.724? If so, is the statute
constitutional? In the language of section 2.724, quoted above,
it is stated that the Court may by rule assign a retired justice
"temporarily." Whether the statutory language bears the meaning given it in practice-the term of Mr. Justice Gallagher's appointment is obviously more "indefinite" than "temporary" 8 considered by a conference of the full court. If the difficulties are not
resolved there, an en banc hearing will be scheduled. Id.
94 See note 72 supra, and accompanying text.
95. MIeN. STAT. § 2.724, subd. 2 (19,37).
96. A survey of every case in which Mr. Justice Gallagher has
participated either as commissioner or, after January, 1967, as an associate justice, indicates no instance in which he has registered a dissent or
special concurrence. But see Heiberg, Social Backgrounds of the Minnesota Supreme Court, 53 MiN. L. Rnv. 901 (1969).
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. At the time of this writing, Mr. Justice Gallagher still functions under the January, 1967, appointment as almost a full participant
in the divisional system and an occasional member of the entire Court
for the drafting of en banc opinions. During the 1967-1968 Term, he
participated in over 25 per cent of all the cases heard by the Court, see
note 8 supra, and in 59 (7 per cent) of the 104 divisional sittings of the
Court after the commencement of the statutory term in January 1968.
Id. See Table I, 1967-1968 Term, infra at 1043. Employing the figures appearing in the text accompanying note 8 supra, the other
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is one question. Whether the statute contemplates such an
assignment when all regular members of the Court are functioning and sitting is another. Both questions probably should
be answered in the negative. It would seem that an indefinite
appointment raises a serious constitutional question under Article VI, section 8, of the Minnesota Constitution, which provides
for limited six-year terms and requires popular election of "all
judges." Moreover, Article VI, section 2 expressly provides
that "a judge of the district court may be assigned as provided
by law temporarily to act as a judge of the supreme court upon
its request." There is no provision anywhere for such a
temporary appointment-and surely no provision for an "indefinite" appointment-of either a retired justice or a Supreme
Court commissioner. Yet, both of these are contemplated, at
least with respect to "temporary" assignments, by section 2.724,
9
subdivision 2.1
It would be constitutional for the Legislature
to expand the size of the Court to as many as nine full-time and
elective members. But Minnesota Statutes section 480.01, stating that "[t]he Supreme Court shall consist of one chief justice and six associate justices . . . ," would seem to indicate
that the Legislature has not exercised this power through section 2.724, subdivision 2. In short, it is respectfully suggested
that the exercise of a vote by a "temporarily" assigned retired
justice or commissioner sitting pursuant to section 2.724, subdivision 2, would be neither permissible under the statute nor
constitutional if so permitted. It necessarily follows that Rule
135 should be read to permit only regularly elected, full-time
members of the Court to vote on a divisional decision. The only
redeeming feature of a contrary, and thus constitutionally infirm, reading of the Rule is that it would avoid most of the problems of the disparity in voting power between the other justices
which would be created by a nonvoting status for Mr. Justice
Gallagher.
Assume next that Mr. Justice Gallagher is not to vote on
divisions, a rather unusual assumption when the Justice sits on
almost four times as many divisions as the number of divisional
opinions he writes. 100 Even here one is left with restive feelings
associate justices of the Supreme Court sat on the following percentages
of divisional cases: Justice Nelson, 62 per cent; Justices Rogosheske,
Sheran and Peterson, 57 per cent; and Justices Murphy and Otis, 56
per cent.
99. Murn. STAT. § 2.724, subd. 2 (1967).
100. Mr. Justice Gallagher wrote only 15 opinions for the 59 divisional sittings recorded for him. See notes 83 & 98 supra; Table I
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about the constitutional and statutory permissibility of a longrange appointment which seems, in practice, to contemplate that
a retired justice be given indefinite tenure as virtually a fulleven if nonvoting-member of the Court. Regardless of its constitutionality, however, a serious objection to the operation of the
divisional system itself is created if Mr. Justice Gallagher sits
as a member of a division without the power to vote. Under
Rule 135, the divisional determination of a case ".

.

. shall be by

the concurrence of four justices ..
."101 And, as previously
mentioned, only a maximum of five justices, including the chief
justice, are assigned to any division.' 0 2 Assuming that Mr.
Justice Gallagher exercises no vote in divisional cases, it follows
that the decision of any division on which he sits will be decided
only by the "concurrence" of four members of the Court at a
maximum-the barest majority of the regular full-time members
of the Court. Another consequence which follows is that any one
regular justice who is a member of such a division has the power
by using only his own vote to require a rehearing en banc. By
dissenting from its decision or language, such a justice can singly
deprive the divisional opinion and decision of the necessary votes
of a majority of the justices on the Court. This, of course,
creates a rank disparity in voting power between these four
justices (one of whom will always be the chief justice) and the
two regular justices who are not members of the division. As to
each of them, the operative language seems still to be that of
Rule 135(3) which requires the objections of two non-sitting justices to require a rehearing en banc. It is no answer that every
regular member of the Court possesses the power under Rule
135 (2) to require an en banc hearing by insisting upon an en banc
designation in the first instance. 0 3 To require a justice to stake
all at the time the Administrative Assistant circulates a list of
cases tentatively destined for divisional hearings would be absurd. Certainly no justice has the time to read the briefs and
record in every case tentatively set for divisional hearing in order
to facilitate intelligent exercise of what otherwise-depending
upon the apparently fortuitous composition of the division-might
1967-1968 Term infra at 1043. Having no vote and not writing the
opinion, no role other than that of discussant seems to be contemplated
under this interpretation.
101. Rule 135 (3). It is doubtful, of course, whether this is anything
other than an expression of the constitutionally irreducible majority
necessary to make it the act of the Court.
102. See note 81 supra, and accompanying text; see also Rule
135(1).
103. Cf. note 80 supra.
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have been his sole opportunity to exercise single-veto power over
divisional or en bane disposition.
Finally, the status of a retired justice cannot be ignored
on the argument that under the divisional system any decision
is theoretically made by the entire Court of seven regular justices rather than by just the five (or four) regular members who
heard the case in division. This argument assumes that a member absent from oral argument and subsequent discussion can
still be considered an active participant in the disposition of a
case. Such an argument is consistent with the apparently prevailing attitude of the justices that oral argument is of little
value, an attitude evidenced by one case during the past Term in
which the opinion-writer had not been present at oral argument
but had merely listened to a tape recording of it!104 However, there is much to be gained from well-conducted oral argumentation, and if so conducted it cannot realistically be suggested that an absent member of the Court can meaningfully
participate. This question, however, persists: what is to be
done with a retired justice sitting pursuant to section 2.724, subdivision 2? Perhaps the most tolerable arrangement would be to
limit his participation to en bane hearings, assigning only regular
members of the Court to divisions. In no event should such a
justice be recognized as possessing the power to vote.
3.

Assignment of Cases for Divisional Disposition

The Rule 135(1) standard for case assignment-"legal and
judicial significance of the issues raised"--provides no assistance
in determining the appropriateness of divisional disposition for
any particular case. 10 5 A more satisfactory explanation of the
factors properly influencing the exercise of discretion in such a
n.1,
104. See State ex rel. Stangvik v. Tahash, __ Minn. .. , 161 N.W.2d 667, 668 n.1 (1968). See also Mnlm. R. Civ. App. P. 134.07
(4):
Whenever any member of the court is not present at the oral
argument of a case, such case shall be deemed submitted to
such member of the court on the record and briefs therein and
when during the consideration of a case there is a change in the
personnel of the court the case shall be deemed submitted to the
new member or members on the record and briefs.
Although sanctioned by custom, see Hunt v. Ward, 193 Minn. 168,
259 N.W. 12 (1935), this usage renders largely ineffectual any attempt to estimate accurately the number of instances in which any
member of the Court was, in fact, absent from oral argument but later
"participated" in decision of the case. By the same token, extreme caution should be employed in drawing inferences from the figures appearing in the "Abstention" column in any of the Tables.
105. See also note 79 supra, and accompanying text.
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determination was given by Mr. Chief Justice Knutson. The specific factors he listed were:
the novelty or difficulty of the legal or factual issues
involved, the seriousness of the criminal offense charged, the
*. .

presence or absence of important constitutional questions, 106
or
the construction of legislation as a matter of first impression.
Yet the Court has been only moderately successful in choosing
the cases to be accorded less than the full attention of all members. There are two distinguishable problems involved. First,
there is the question of whether cases raising certain predictable
issues in a predictable manner should be relegated to divisional
hearing. Second, there is the somewhat more difficult question
of how to handle the apparently "routine" case that develops,
either upon argument or during division deliberation, into a case
of more than routine proportions.
Three cases illustrate these difficulties. In State v.
Schmidt,0 7 the Court was plainly presented with the issue of
the constitutionality of a so-called "Green River" ordinance enacted by the city council of Brainerd, Minnesota, and requiring
the bonding of nonresident house-to-house peddlers. A fivejustice division unanimously struck down the ordinance as violative of the equal protection clauses of the federal and state
constitutions and of the federal interstate commerce clause. It
is submitted that this case should have been decided only by the
entire Court. One might have no difficulty with the position
taken by the division opinion-writer that the constitutional issues presented no difficulty and were well-settled. 108 But in
applying a hierarchy of values to guide selection of cases to be
heard by the entire Court, certainly a case involving the validity of a proscription enacted by an important unit of state government should rank high. At issue in such cases is the maintenance of both symbolic and substantive divisions between
different levels of state government. This is even more true
when, as in the Schmidt case, the trial court held the ordinance
valid. State v. Johnson'0 9 and State v. Wolske""1 were similarly ill-advised. In Johnson, a guilty plea to third-degree
murder was challenged as having been unconstitutionally elicited
in the course of plea-bargaining. The case was heard by a division which decided, for the first time, that plea-bargaining was
106. Knutson, supra note 76, at 6, 7.

107.

280 Minn. 281, 159 N.W.2d 113 (1968).

108. See id. at 284, 159 N.W.2d at 113.
109.

279 Minn.209, 156 N.W.2d 218 (1968).

110.

280 Minn. 465, 160 N.W.2d 146 (1968).
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permissible in Minnesota criminal trials so long as compliance
was had with several stated standards."'
In Wolske, a different division held that a person convicted of a crime more serious than that to which he had bargained to plead guilty should
be permitted to withdraw his plea if the prosecutor had failed to
fulfill his part of the agreement. 112 I have no substantial difficulties with the manner in which the opinion in either Johnson
or Wolske was written. But here again it should have been
apparent to the Court that these cases involved questions of
"far-reaching potential" 13 and should have been assigned to an
en banc hearing, not relegated to divisional disposition.
It might be argued that the importance of the issues involved
in the above or similar cases was obscure or totally unrevealed
at the time the original divisional and en banc calendars were
composed. But this would justify only the initial assignment
and hearing of the case, not its final divisional disposition. If
oral argument is effectively utilized, an apparently "routine"
case will sometimes be discovered to involve a question best
suited for full and active participation by all members of the
Court.1 14 It would seem that Rule 135 should be amended to
make it clear that in such cases the majority on a division could
provide for rehearing by the full Court, even in the absence
of disagreement over a decision. This, together with a more attentive examination of appealed cases to isolate those of substantial institutional and constitutional importance, should lead to a
more sure-handed allocation of the Court's resources between
en banc and divisional hearings.
V. CONCLUSION
The opening of the 1969 statutory term of the Minnesota
Supreme Court is marked by uncertainty and experimentation.
A partially completed study of the Court's caseload, gauged
111.

See State v. Johnson, 279 Minn. 209, 214-16, 156 N.W.2d 218,

222-23 (1968).

112. As in Johnson, so here the division opinion relied heavily upon
suggested standards proposed by a committee of the American Bar
Association. See State v. Wolske, 280 Minn. 465, 469-72, 160 N.W.2d
146, 150-52 (1968).
113. State v.Johnson,279 Minn.209, 156 N.W.2d 218, 222 (1968).

114. In State v.Wolske, 280 Minn. 465, 467, 160 N.W.2d 146, 148
(1968), the division opinion stated that, although the claims originally
asserted on appeal were found to be without merit and many of the
asserted facts without support inthe record, "... itdeveloped on oral
argument that a question of first impression which we are compelled to
answer on this appeal.. ." was presented.
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against the caseload traditionally borne by the Court, suggests
that this is by no means a period of unprecedented pressures.
Nonetheless, the Court and the Minnesota Judicial Council seem
to have assumed that the caseload has reached or is rapidly
reaching the point of intolerabilit and that recent increases
will continue indefinitely. In candor, I must confess that my
reading of the statistics does not lead to the same assumptions.
Several factors other than the sheer number of cases-for example, the Court's processes and habits particularly with respect
to opinion-drafting, the work habits of individual justices, and
the quality of the work done by members of the bar who habitually practice before the Court-might provide an equally plausible explanation for this impression of intolerability apparently
shared by the members of the Court. While a reduction in numbers through creation of an intermediate court of appeals probably would cure current pressures, it might do so at an unnecessarily high price. The challenge of the intermediate court of
appeals proposal, as it appears to me, is not to support or oppose
it but to search out the core problems afflicting the Court.
This challenge is all the more urgent in view of the divisional sitting device to which the Court has resorted in attempting to relieve the caseload pressure. Even if the several noted
defects in the divisional system were immediately corrected, the
Court would still be left operating with a serious barrier to
greatness. A great court must of necessity be a composite of
the diverse talents and skills of its members. A court operating
under a divisive system that tends to lessen the mutual interaction of its members must necessarily forfeit attainment of that
greatness.

